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Abstract

Development projects usually benefit when expertise is drawn from diverse sources,
including potential users. Orchestrating the involvement of disparate groups requires
finding a balance between differentiation, when teams work separately , and
integration, when groups meet to exchange knowledge. This article argues that a
“community of practice” perspective can help project managers achieve this balance,
by drawing attention to the assumptions, interests, skills, and formal and tacit
knowledge of the different groups involved. Using a case study as illustration, we
show that integration can be achieved by ensuring that the developing technology is
comprehensible to all groups concerned, and that it satisfies their various interests.

Keywords
Managing Projects, Teams, Culture, Technology, Innovation, Communities of
practice
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Introduction
The success of complex technology development projects depends heavily on
the ability of team members to interact productively so that relevant knowledge can
be acquired, generated and circulated in a timely and cost-effective fashion. Often,
projects benefit from the integration of expertise from different specialisms [1,2],
including potential users. In this article we demonstrate how a “communities of
practice” perspective can help project managers to maximize the fruitfulness of the
relationships that are crucial to knowledge exchange in complex projects. As
Nidumolu et al.[3] noted recently, there is a “ground beneath” knowledge
management that consists of the situated contexts in which the production and
exchange of knowledge occur. The management of complex projects requires an
appreciation of this ground, so that degrees of engagement among diverse groups
can be varied over time. This involves a balance between differentiation – when
communities work in relative isolation from one another – and integration – when
they are brought together to exchange knowledge and skills. A communities of
practice perspective draws attention to the social processes that produce
differentiation, as well as processes that facilitate productive integration.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we briefly discuss the characteristics of
communities of practice. We then consider different ways of organizing technology
projects as alternative ways of structuring communities and establishing channels
of communication among them. To illustrate how a community of practice
perspective can facilitate an understanding of the issues involved, we draw on a
case study of a project that was carried out in a manufacturing firm in Australia.
As the project progressed, its organization was characterized by a shift in emphasis

4
from differentiation to integration. The flows of knowledge generated by this shift
turned out to be quite different from those envisaged at the outset. Despite this (or
more accurately, because of it) the project succeeded. While it is important to
specify and pursue technical goals, complex projects are also social enterprises.
Applying a communities of practice perspective to our case study, we highlight
some of the social processes that contributed to success – the use of brokers to
bring diverse communities together, and the importance of aligning interests around
the technology that is being developed.
Situating Knowledge and Skills – Communities of Practice
The concept of communities of practice has recently gained attention as a way
of explaining how knowledge and learning develop in specific social contexts [4,
5,6,7]. According to Wenger [5, p. 45],
Over time, … collective learning results in practices that reflect both the
pursuit of our enterprises and the attendant social relations. These practices
are thus the property of a kind of community created over time by the
sustained pursuit of a shared enterprise. It makes sense, therefore, to call
these kinds of communities communities of practice (emphasis in original).
Communities of practice are organised around circumscribed sets of activities
and their members are generally in direct contact with each other. They develop
their own routines, formal and informal “rules”, and stores of shared assumptions
and knowledge. Over time, they often create their own languages, which may
contain jargon and colloquialisms whose meanings are obscure to outsiders. As a
result of learning, practices evolve. However, community members may also import
knowledge from similar communities or more disparate sources. The extent to
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which a community of practice learns internally or imports new knowledge is in
part a function of the nature of the practices it undertakes. In many complex
technology projects, knowledge acquired from external sources, that is, from other
communities of practice, is crucial.
Projects and Communities of Practice
It is important to distinguish between projects and communities of practice.
There are differences in personnel, goals, and how they located in time. Projects
are more clearly instrumental than communities of practice. A project may be
defined as “any undertaking that has definite final objectives representing specified
values to be used in the satisfaction of some need or desire” [8]. What
distinguishes a project from many other activities is that it has a defined point at
which it is completed.
Projects also differ from communities of practice in their ad hoc nature. They
have no collective history (although some members of the project may share a
history), and no collective future. Nevertheless, the people who work on a project
may belong to a number of communities of practice. For example, in a matrix
organization, the membership of functional teams extending beyond the project
remains explicit for many project participants. The extent to which a community of
practice is involved in project activities can vary, with clients perhaps only
peripherally associated, while team managers may devote virtually all of their
attention to the project. Communities of practice operating within a project allow
for concentrations of expertise. However, a high degree of differentiation may
make it difficult for participants to develop project-wide goals if members of
particular communities are too focused on internal concerns.
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Varieties of Project Organization
Project organisations have been used since “cavemen formed a project to gather
the raw material for mammoth stew” [9, p. 7]. Formal interest in project
management grew during and after the Second World War as a result of a number
of gigantic development undertakings, many of which were defence related [10].
Depending on size and complexity, projects can be organised differently. Meredith
and Mantel [9] describe three basic types of organisation. One is to assign a project
to a functional section of a larger organisation, for example to give it a “home” in
the engineering division or the accounting department. Secondly, a project may be
accommodated in a pure project organisation, a separate, largely self-contained
section that is devoted exclusively to the project and will be disbanded when the
project is completed or abandoned. Finally, projects may be run on a matrix basis
in which control rests with a project manager but the bulk of the human and other
resources are “borrowed” from different sections in the larger organisation. Hobday
[11] has refined this into six different forms, including three types of matrix
organisations. Regardless of the form a project organisation takes, however,
problems of managing connections among people with different areas of expertise
remain.
The baseline for technology development processes, against which more recent
commentators have reacted, is a model of sequential interdependence [12], in which
downstream stages depend on those that precede them but there is no reciprocity.
When this is the case, planning, development, manufacturing, marketing, and use
can all be planned without reference to what might happen later. From the 1980s,
however, increased competition from Japanese firms suggested that sequential
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organisation was too time-consuming [13,14,15,16]. Alternatives were developed.
Stalk and Hout [13], for example, established rules for design teams that included
mixed membership across functional areas, co-location of team members and other
ways of achieving quicker and tighter co-ordination. Similarly, Smith and
Reinertsen [17] advocated cross-functional groups that brought together marketing,
development and manufacturing representatives from the onset. In this way,
opportunities for the transfer of tacit as well as formal knowledge are enhanced
[18,19].
In recent decades, the role of potential users in the process of technology design
has gained increasing attention [20, 21, 22, 23]. In theory, different relationships
between users and developers are possible, spanning the spectrum from complete
differentiation to close integration. Sometimes, technologies can be successfully
developed without any contact with potential users [24]. Provided the new products
are comprehensible and easily integrated, minimal interaction between developers
and users need not to be a barrier to adoption [23, p. 98]. On the other hand, when
new technologies and the systems into which they are to be introduced are
complex, lack of knowledge exchange can lead to considerable problems. Millions
of dollars have been wasted on technologies that were never successfully adopted
[23, p. 98-99, 25].
To counteract these problems, various levels of user participation in design and
implementation have been advocated. In some cases, users are so heavily involved
in the design of a technology that they are, in effect, co-developers [23, p. 100102]. In general, however, users lack the expertise to carry out development
activities themselves, especially when advanced technical skills are required.
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Connections between developers and users are thus likely to fall somewhere
between the two extremes of complete differentiation and total integration.
While integration may, in theory, facilitate more efficient sharing of
knowledge, there are obstacles that must be overcome. Leonard-Barton [23] has
pointed out that people within communities develop particular mindsets and
“signature skills” that are, in part, products of their professional training. Indeed,
they are the means through which group members distinguish their own activities
from those of others. The problem for project managers is to overcome barriers to
communication created by the existence of groups with quite different skills,
languages, expectations and assumptions. Some authors [17, 26] have argued that
different arrangements are appropriate depending on circumstances. In some
situations, differentiation, balanced with collaboration rather than integration, may
be beneficial. Quinn et al.[26] for example, cite complexity as a major reason for
the success of what they call “independent collaboration” in innovative situations.
“In an increasing number of innovations … complexity is so high (as in advanced
physics, aerospace, communications, or biotechnology projects) that teams, as they
are ordinarily defined, cannot cope as well as collaboration among a large number
of relatively independent units” (p. 107).
Clearly, there is no “one-size-fits-all” prescription for effective project
management. In complex projects at least some differentiation is advantageous, as
it facilitates the concentration of expertise. However, as Lawrence and Lorsch [27],
Chandler [28] and Galbraith [29] have all emphasised, differentiation also requires
collaboration and/or integration. This is widely recognised in the project
management literature [30, 31, 32]. To illustrate some of the issues associated with
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differentiation and integration in complex technology projects, we turn now to our
case study. The case highlights the importance of managing flows of knowledge
between two important groups that are almost always involved in projects –
technology developers and end-users. The relationship between these groups is
frequently quite delicate, and many projects have failed because it has not been
managed well.
Research Methodology

The first and third authors were involved with the IMS project from mid-1996
to November 1998. As management academics with an interest in the social aspects of
technology design, we were contracted by the developers of the IMS to help them
organise a factory trial of the new technology. [Name] took a leading role in arranging
and conducting meetings and workshops, while [name] acted solely as a nonparticipant observer and analyst. Our methodology could be characterised as reflexive
action research [33]. During the IMS trial period, one or more members of our
research team [include footnote with other names] spent more than 20 days with the
developers and/or factory personnel. A variety of activities were involved –
conducting meetings and workshops, and collecting data through observations and
interviews, and from documents produced by the R&D team and the IMS test factory.
All researchers took notes and recorded their reflections of events.
The IMS Case Study - Differentiation and the Identification of ‘Human
Factors’ risks
The organisation in which we conducted our research is a well-established,
large and diverse mining and manufacturing company. The bulk of its factories
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and mines contain complex mixtures of old and new equipment. During the 1990s,
the company supported a number of in-house R&D laboratories, in which more
advanced experimental technologies were built and tested. The intelligent
manufacturing system (IMS) was one of these. It consisted of a set of
interconnected computers and software designed to provide finely-tuned control of
a continuous manufacturing process. In its fully-functioning form, the computers
would be attached to pieces of equipment at critical points along the process. They
would gather and exchange data about the equipment and the process, and adjust
settings to optimise the functioning of the system as a whole. For example, if a
valve in one piece of equipment was worn or broken, the IMS would be able to
adjust settings elsewhere to compensate [34].
The IMS R&D team was established by senior company executives in 1994.
The initial aim was to build a system in a laboratory setting so that its capabilities
could be explored. This would allow the company to be an “intelligent customer”
of the technology in the future, and also to influence standards if and when the
technology became commercially available. The R&D team consisted of 8
qualified computer scientists who, by virtue of their shared expertise, common task
and close interaction, constituted a community of practice. In the laboratory, they
used simulated data and a scaled-down model of a manufacturing process to build
an experimental IMS. They did so without reference to the factory operators who
would eventually use the technology, should it ever be installed. At this stage, the
major “users” of the project’s output - arguably information rather than a working
artifact – were senior company executives. In this specialized environment, the
concentration of expertise facilitated rapid development of the software. Because
the technology worked well in the simulated conditions, a decision was made to
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test it in an actual manufacturing site. This would yield further, and probably more
relevant, information about its capabilities. This decision introduced a new group of
users, and a new set of challenges with respect to knowledge transfer and learning.
The employees at the test site, which was more than 1,000 km away from the
company’s main research laboratories, comprised another distinct community of
practice. The site was selected because its manufacturing process was relatively
stable and well understood. Sufficient data were available at various points along
the process to make an IMS feasible. Nevertheless, the developers realized that
implementation would not be straightforward. In the past, there had been
considerable problems with the transfer of technology from laboratories to worksites within this company. The factory chosen for the IMS trial had, some years
earlier, been the site of an unsuccessful technology transfer. In 1988, employees
were sent on a holiday while the factory was upgraded. No-one told them what was
happening. When they came back, they found a new product tracking device that
simply did not work. They tried to fix it, and, in their own words, “created a
monster”. It took years of tinkering to make the device useful. The drama
surrounding the installation was still notorious almost a decade later, when the
factory was chosen as the site of the IMS trial.
By 1996, when planning for the trial began, the company was conducting “risk
reviews” in an effort to prevent such problems. The IMS risk review identified a set
of “human factors” risks as particularly important. They included fears that the
IMS “won’t be simple enough for staff for handle”, that its “continued use [would
lead to] operator deskilling” and that there would be “inadequate preparation of
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end-users”. After the meeting, the developers summarized these concerns into a
single statement of risk - that “end users do not adopt the technology”.
By identifying the possibility of user rejection, the risk reviewers had implicitly
acknowledged the existence of a separate and distinct community of practice at the
test factory, whose actions with regard to the new technology were unpredictable.
Moreover, because of the problems created by the company’s traditional “leave it at
the doorstep” approach to technology implementation, relationships between
factory workers and technology developers were often characterised by suspicion
and distrust. To overcome these barriers, the developers employed a mechanism
that is frequently used by people trying to establish connections across the
boundaries of different communities of practice. They engaged brokers – a group of
academics from [site withheld] who were contracted to “reduce the risks of user
opposition or lack of involvement” in the IMS trial. This contractual obligation,
together with statements made at the risk review, give important indications of the
developers’ view of their relationship with the users at this early and crucial phase
of the project. They assumed that the flow of knowledge would be uni-directional.
That is, for the trial to work, the users would have to be educated to accept and
operate the IMS.
Brokering – Bringing Communities Together
Wenger [5, p. 109] defined brokering as the “use of multimembership to
transfer some element of one practice into another”. In our case, our ability to
facilitate the transfer of elements of practice did not depend on our being members
of the communities involved. Indeed, our legitimacy was probably enhanced by our
status as “outsiders”. Non-membership does have disadvantages, however. The
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early stages of our involvement were characterized by some confusion, as we
struggled to familiarize ourselves with the worldviews, expectations and motives of
the developers on one hand, and the people working at the test site on the other. As
Wenger [5, p. 109] notes,
The job of brokering is complex. It involves processes of translation,
coordination, and alignment between perspectives. It requires enough
legitimacy to influence the development of a practice, mobilize attention, and
address conflicting interests.
These observations remain valid whether the brokers are imported from
outside, as was the case in the IMS project, or whether they emerge from within the
communities themselves. The important point is that integration of knowledge
across communities requires a great deal of work in creating and maintaining social
relationships. It is not merely a technical task.
Between May 1997 and February 1998 we and other participants in the IMS
project arranged a series of “boundary encounters” [5, p. 112] – meetings,
telephone calls, workshops and other activities that facilitated exchanges of
information among groups. At first, there was some confusion, as perspectives
were not aligned. The developers were primarily interested in conducting a trial
that was valid and meaningful for them. Initially, however, the manager at the test
site was reluctant to participate, thinking that the trial would be “a pain in the arse”.
In his experience, new technology often “arrived at the doorstep and it’s never as
good as they say it’s going to be”. Subsequently, however, he changed his mind. It
is often difficult to ascertain people’s motives, but there are several reasons why he
may have chosen to assist the trial. Firstly, supporting innovation would have
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helped his career. Secondly, the risk review workshop and our involvement as
brokers demonstrated that this particular technology was not going to just “arrive”
and cause problems for factory operations because of a lack of care with
integration. Thirdly, the test factory managers had been conducting team-building
exercises aimed at improving productivity and morale. The activities associated
with the trial could provide another opportunity for eliciting greater operator
interest and involvement in the running of the factory. Finally, there were technical
reasons to support the development of more sophisticated computer control. The
manufacturing process at the factory was rapid, and several key pieces of
equipment had to be finely tuned and coordinated. There was considerable tacit
skill involved in providing the optimal equipment settings. The IMS computers
could potentially help with this, thereby enhancing productivity and
competitiveness.
Gaining the support of the factory manager was an important early step in
preparing for the trial. However, the cooperation of the operators was also required.
As the risk review noted, there was a distinct possibility that the workers at the test
site would not,1 or could not, do what was required to produce a valid test of the
technology. Equipment upgrades in the company had often meant job losses.
Greater computer control over the manufacturing process could mean that valuable
tacit knowledge would be lost as operations became more automated. The IMS was
also technically complex. The R&D team was concerned that operators “would
need a degree in computer science” in order to work the technology, even if they
were prepared to incorporate it into their normal daily activities.
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Ensuring the alignment of the operators was our major task as brokers.
However, we had our own perspectives on the IMS and the trial. Influenced by
traditions of humanistic user-centered technology design, we wanted to make sure
that the needs, aspirations and preferences of the factory personnel were taken into
account. In other words, we wanted to steer the project in a direction that would do
more than just elicit operator compliance. To this end, we negotiated opportunities
to introduce and discuss methods for improving technology design by taking
greater account of the needs and preferences of users [35, 36]. However, because
the IMS was already fairly well-developed, the scope for the use of these methods
was minor. Despite this, discussion of the methods did provide a focus for direct
productive interaction between the developers and users.2 They helped to break the
ice and made later communication easier. One of the developers was based close to
the factory site, and became a regular conduit of information. As the
communication channels became more developed, the technologists began to learn
from the operators. On several occasions, the company provided funding for
employees to fly more than 1,000 km to the research laboratories to view the
simulated factory process and the IMS prior to its installation. We were not present
at these meetings, and our information about them is derived from what others have
told us. The visits were, apparently, quite significant in contributing to the success
of the trial. One of the factory workers who made the trip said “to be honest, the
thing wasn’t really anything like [the plant]. It was completely devoid of the way
we do things. Similar principle, but...”. According the technologists, “eight or nine”
details of the IMS and the trial were changed as a result of the visits. The
1

Leonard-Barton [23, p. 46] describes a case in which the introduction of new
equipment at a aluminium plant was sabotaged by the workforce. Similar sabotage
had occurred in the past at the firm that developed and tested the IMS

16
developers’ plans to use the IMS to completely control the process were dropped,
as the operators convinced them that it would not be feasible. Instead, the IMS
would suggest equipment settings, and the operators had the option of accepting or
rejecting them.
The trial, when it came, was a success. The operators cooperated, and the
developers were able to “prove the concept” of the IMS by demonstrating that
when aspects of the manufacturing process were varied, the technology was able to
suggest equipment settings that compensated for the variations. This situation was
in marked contrast to the debacle of the product tracking device that was installed
in 1988. The major difference between the two projects was the amount of care
taken with the IMS to ensure a productive integration of the knowledge and
practices of technology developers and users.
Connecting Communities by Aligning Interests around Boundary Objects
The varieties of project organization outlined earlier, and the strategies for
involving users discussed above, are all concerned with managing the balance
between differentiation and integration. It is unlikely that a single form of project
organization will prove effective in all circumstances. Given this contingency,
project managers would be well advised to pay attention to the social ground
beneath the production and exchange of knowledge, namely the communities of
practice that are involved in technology projects. There are two related aspects of
project management that we believe are particularly pertinent to the achievement of
successful integration. Firstly , it is important to try to align the interests of the

2

This phase is described in more detail in [37, 38,39].
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different groups involved. Secondly, interests need to be organized productively
around the central focus of the project, that is, the developing technology itself.
Abstract “needs” for information transfer do not, in themselves, propel action.
The needs must be recognized as such by the actors involved, who must initiate
actions that allow exchanges to occur. In the IMS project, the developers
recognized a need to transfer knowledge into the community of users. They
engaged us as brokers, and a mutually acceptable alignment of interests was
negotiated through a contract that allowed us to pursue some of our own goals in
exchange for ensuring operator cooperation with the trial. However, and most
importantly, we also had to align the interests of the factory personnel. Our strategy
of broadening the scope of the project to include a consideration of principles of
user-centred design seemed to work. It provided opportunities for the operators to
influence the final stages of the design of the IMS, and planning for the trial. As
one of the factory workers said, “It’s the first time we’ve actually been asked for
input. And I will admit that it’s good to get away from the bloody day-in, day-out
grind to actually do something different”. This quotation hints at another reason the
men (they were all men) supported the trial. It provided relief from boredom. They
held competitions between themselves and the technology to see which could
suggest the most effective equipment settings. According the developers, the results
were “neck-and-neck”, a situation that would probably have provoked further
competition (that is, cooperation with the trial) . Finally, the technology was highly
experimental. It was not going to remain at the site, and there were no immediate
prospects of job losses or deskilling. The fact that the technology could potentially
assist, rather than replace, operators might also have been a factor in the acceptance
of the trial.
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The establishment of friendly relationships between developers and users,
however, is irrelevant if technologies remain alien and ineffectual for those who are
supposed to use them. In other words, when highlighting the importance of human
relationships in technology development projects, it is important not to lose sight of
the overall goal – the production of a useful, working artifact. For successful
integration to occur, the technology must function as a “boundary object”. This is
an object that is “both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of
the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common
identity across sites” [40, p. 393]. The importance of this mutual comprehensibility
is illustrated by the case of the failed product tracking device that was installed in
the test factory in 1988. It may have worked perfectly well in the research
laboratory, but it was not robust and plastic enough to be integrated into its new
environment.
In the IMS project, the IMS itself functioned as a boundary object. The
negotiation of meanings around this central object constituted the integration of
knowledge that contributed to the production of a viable, working technology. The
integration was facilitated by actual physical contact with the object itself.
Demonstrations of the IMS in operation were organised for factory personnel
before the trial, using simulated data and a scaled-down model of the
manufacturing process. These demonstrations provided valuable opportunities for
tapping into the accumulated expertise possessed by the factory workers. As one of
the technology developers noted, the factory operators raised “issues about the
complexity of the mill versus our simulation that we hadn’t considered”. They
were able to make final adjustments that ensured a smooth passage of the
technology from the research laboratory into the test factory. The details of the
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knowledge that needed to be transferred for the trial to succeed could not be
predicted in advance. However, by crafting opportunities for people from the two
groups to mingle and establish social relationships, the project managers created
conditions conducive for the alignment of interests, and the identification and
closure of gaps in knowledge.
Summary and Implications for Managing Complex Technology Projects

Analysts generally agree that the design of new technologies can be enhanced
by integrating knowledge and skills from a variety of sources. Potential users are
often depicted as a particularly rich and relevant source of knowledge, and much
effort has been devoted to defining the conditions under which productive relations
between developers and users can be established and exploited [20, 21, 41].
Creating a sensible balance between differentiation and integration is part of this
endeavor, and a variety of project forms may be effective in enabling and enhancing
timely communication and cooperation. However, to optimise relations between
different groups, project participants need to construct integrating institutions based
on effective mental maps of the social landscapes in which projects are conducted.
A community of practice perspective can assist with this endeavour.

The importance of taking communities of practice into account is illustrated by
the case study, which includes varying levels of understanding on the part of
developers of the existence and potential contributions of communities of users. Three
primary communities of practice were involved in this instance, the developers of the
IMS, the major corporate sponsors (who were also users in an abstract sense), and the
people in the plant in which the IMS was tested. The earlier failure to install a
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tracking device in the factory suggested that the developers needed to take care to
consult the users effectively on this occasion. The knowledge limitations inherent in
the developers’ community of practice meant that they could not fully comprehend
the practical implications of using the IMS within the broader system of work
undertaken in the factory. If this were the only gap between the communities of users
and developers, the IMS as a boundary object might on its own have served as an
integrating agent to bring about a shared understanding leading to necessary
modifications in the IMS. In this case, however, more was needed because the social
landscape in the factory, among both managers and workers on the shop floor, created
substantial skepticism towards the objectives of the project as a whole. For their part,
the designers viewed the users through lenses coloured by their own interests and
worldviews. That is, they saw the users as either resistant or compliant, not as active
contributors of knowledge. Thus brokers were needed as a further integrating agent,
to help generate an environment in which both communities of practice were willing
to concentrate on operationalising the boundary object rather than focusing on their
own narrow preconceptions.

All complex projects need people to act as brokers, transferring and translating
knowledge, and aligning interests and perspectives as projects move through phases
of differentiation and integration. In the final testing and implementation stages,
these activities should be directed towards ensuring the technology is comprehensible
to people in the relevant communities, and that it is flexible enough to accommodate
their different needs and preferences. Further research is needed on strategies that
brokers can use to facilitate productive integration. This requires field work, as
factors influencing success and failure may not be entirely ‘rational’. For example, the
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capacity of the IMS to relieve boredom was a factor in the success of the trial. Only
by exploring more fully the social dimensions of crafting new technologies can we
create appropriate integrating agents to optimise conditions for productive
engagement by diverse communities of practice.
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